Torts--Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury by Dressler, Jean Karen
Volume 76 | Issue 2 Article 6
February 1974
Torts--Expanding the Concept of Recovery for
Mental and Emotional Injury
Jean Karen Dressler
West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jean K. Dressler, Torts--Expanding the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury, 76 W. Va. L. Rev. (1974).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol76/iss2/6
TORTS-EXPANDING THE CONCEPT OF
RECOVERY FOR MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL
INJURY
I. INTRODUCTION
Liability for negligently caused mental and emotional injuries
is one of the most controversial and complicated areas in the field
of tort law. Over the past century, and especially during the last
three decades, its development has run the gamut from a mere
parasitic action to an independent action in tort. Nevertheless,
case law is still in a state of confusion. Some courts, in an effort to
justify recovery for mental and emotional injury, have created
myriad theories to bring the remedies within the scope of already
existing tort actions.' Others have rejected recovery with an equal
amount of justification. As one author aptly suggested, "[a]ny
attempt at a consistent exegesis of authorities is likely to break
down in embarrassed perplexity."'2
Nevertheless, a trend toward the recognition of the right to
recover for mental and emotional injuries has clearly developed,'
although West Virginia courts have yet to allow recovery for negli-
gently caused mental injuries without accompanying physical in-
juries. West Virginia's failure to keep pace with this trend is
evidenced by Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co.' In
Monteleone, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recog-
nized that recovery could be sustained where: (1) Mental disturb-
'For an examination of the various theories, see Harper and McNeely, A Re-
examination of the Basis for Liability for Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. RFv. 426.
2Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 103 (1959).
3See, e.g., Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961). In that
case the court noted that the doctrine of no recovery for mental injuries incurred
by fright has been rejected by a majority of American jurisdictions, abandoned by
many which originally adopted it, and diluted by the minority that retained it.
Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 730. See also app. I infra.
1128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945). Subsequent West Virginia cases estab-
lish a trend of allowing recovery for mental and emotional injuries; however, each
recovery has been predicated on some ground other than solely negligent infliction
of emotional harm. See Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967)
(recovery disallowed for mental suffering caused by the defendant's negligent steri-
lization operation on plaintiff's wife); Julian v. DeVincent, 184 S.E.2d 535 (W. Va.
1971) (recovery disallowed for mental suffering caused by death of plaintiff's dog,
killed by defendant's dog); Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d
716 (1959) (recovery allowed for mental suffering when trespass or invasion of pri-
vacy); Toler v. Cassinelli, 129 W. Va. 591, 41 S.E.2d 672 (1946) (recovery allowed
for mental suffering caused by defendant's unreasonable and willful conduct).
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ances accompany or follow actual physical injury caused by impact
at the occurrence of the tort; (2) no impact or physical injury
occurs at the time, but a physical injury later results as the causal
effect of a nervous shock which in turn was the proximate result
of the defendant's wrong; and (3) no impact or physical injury is
caused by the defendant's wrong, but an emotional or mental dis-
turbance is shown to have been the result of the defendant's inten-
tional or wanton wrongful act.5 However, the court summarily re-
jected a fourth category based on recovery for mental and emo-
tional injuries caused by negligence alone, unaccompanied by bod-
ily injury. This category was swiftly passed over by the court as
encompassing merely embryonic legal theories.6 These embryonic
theories have already reached fetal stages. With current advance-
ments in medical technology and continual evolution of a cause of
action in tort for psychic injury, the time is ripe for analysis and
discussion of legal actions for negligently caused mental and emo-
tional injuries.
The Monteleone decision, the last major word of the court on
this topic, provides the lawyer with little assistance in the area of
negligently caused mental and emotional injuries. Therefore, the
purpose of this note is to provide current insight into this area and,
ultimately, to show that a mental and emotional injury can and
should create a cause of action with recovery based on the merits
of each individual case. The approach is threefold: (1) To examine
the history and development of emotional and mental torts in West
Virginia by analyzing the major West Virginia cases; (2) to eluci-
date the various medico-legal problems which are paramount; and
(3) to discuss the possible theories in support of a cause of action
for mental and emotional torts.
I. BACKGROUND OF MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURY LAW IN WEST
VIRGINIA
A. Prior to Monteleone
Although the Monteleone case was one of first impression in
West Virginia in determining whether there could be recovery for
1Id. at 347, 36 S.E.2d at 478.
cqhe court's reason for even commenting on these embryonic theories was, in
its own words, to "illustrate a phase of the perpetual evolution of the common law
in its effort to keep abreast of development and progress." Id. at 347, 36 S.E.2d at
478.
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posttraumatic psychoneurosis' caused by shock, prior cases dealt
with recovery for mental and emotional injuries. As early as 1899,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals propounded the im-
pact rule as a requisite to recovery for mental injury. By way of
dictum in Davis v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,9 the court recog-
nized that mental suffering without physical injurs would not sus-
tain an action for damages because mental and emotional injuries
were too vague and subjective in nature to warrant compensation.
The court noted an exception, however, in cases where such dam-
ages were so inseparably connected with physical pain that they
became indistinguishable.'0
Again, in 1910, the court, in Pennington v. Gillaspie," denied
recovery for mental injury, declaring that mental suffering, sorrow,
fear, and anxiety caused by humiliation through public degrada-
tion would not alone permit recovery without proof of actual injury
to person, property, or means of support. Although the impact rule
7Posttraumatic psychoneurosis is used here to designate a functional nervous
disease or disorder following an accident, injury, or shock.
'Since I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S., 22 Edw. III, f. 99, pl. 60 (1348), courts
have protected the individual's right to mental tranquility. However, such protec.
tion has been recognized primarily when some other interest of the plaintiff is
invaded. The courts have been reluctant to afford such protection in an indepen.
dent action for mental or emotional harm. See, e.g., Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis.
2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970). Problems of proof, the intangible character of the
injury, and fictional claims are relevant considerations. Today, however, in light
of medical advancements and the higher standards placed on individuals in society
to protect others' peace of mind, these justifications have been largely refuted. See,
e.g., George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915 (Mass. 1971). In answer to the
possibility of fraudulent claims, the court stated that the advancement of medical
science should be sufficient to take care of these problems. Id. at 919. Moreover,
there has been a revelation of some of the anomalies in earlier legal theories. For
example, courts previously have distinguished intentional from negligent acts be.
cause the former were deemed to be more indicative of genuine mental injuries. See,
e.g., Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc., 208 Va. 438, 158 S.E,2d 124 (1967). This
reasoning seems neither logical nor sound. By simple illustration, suppose plaintiffs
A and B suffer identical injuries caused by fright evolving respectively from identi-
cal actions of the defendants X and Y. The only distinction in the two cases is that
X acted intentionally; Y acted negligently. It hardly seems rational that A be
allowed and B disallowed a cause of action merely on the basis of whether the
defendant's action was intentional or negligent. "The concern should be with the
nature of the plaintiff's injury rather than the nature of the defendant's conduct."
Hochman, 'Outrageousness' and Privilege in the Law of Emotional Distress - A
Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 61, 65 (1961).
'46 W. Va. 48, 32 S.E. 1026 (1899).
11Id. at 53, 32 S.E. at 1028.
"66 W. Va. 643, 66 S.E. 1009 (1910).
[Vol. 76
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continued to be enforced, the court did allude to the parasitic tort
theory'2 and seemed to imply that proof of even the slightest physi-
cal injury would permit recovery.'" In Pennington, the plaintiffs
husband, while intoxicated, had thrown several cups at her, but
ironically, and perhaps unfortunately in light of the court's deci-
sion, the cups missed their mark. Thus, the plaintiff could not
present any evidence of physical injury at the trial, and the court
was unable to find a "particle of evidence of any actual physical
injury"'4 on which to permit recovery for mental suffering.
In a further evolution of the parasitic tort theory, a series of
cases arose in which the court did find liability for psychic harm
without impact. However, in each of these cases, there existed an
already recognized legal injury to which the mental and emotional
injury could be attached. For example, recovery was allowed for
mental pain and suffering for false arrest and imprisonment,'" and,
likewise, liability was found where a defendant falsely and without
grounds swore out a warrant against the plaintiff.'" The court de-
clared in each of these cases that mental pain and suffering and
the insult, indignity, and humiliation inflicted by the wrongful and
unlawful acts constituted a just basis for damages. 7 These cases,
"The parasitic tort theory developed as one of the earliest methods by which
mental or emotional damage could create a cause of action. According to this
theory, any independent tort, no matter how technical, could be used as the peg
upon which to hang the mental damages and, thus, create a cause of action for such
damages. See, e.g., Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort,
37 MICH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
"66 W. Va. at 643, 66 S.E. at 1009. Plaintiff's instruction number four was
predicated on two grounds for damages, i.e., injury to the person and injury to the
plaintiff's means of support. The court affirmed the lower court's refusal to give this
instruction because "some physical violence or injury is required" and the plaintiff
had failed to show even a "particle of evidence of any actual physical injury." Id.
at 653-54, 66 S.E. at 1013 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 654, 66 S.E. at 1013.
"Johnson v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 82 W. Va. 692, 97 S.E. 189 (1918).
"Jones v. Hebdo, 88 W. Va. 386, 106 S.E. 898 (1921).
"There are other instances in which a cause of action has been allowed for
mental and emotional injuries due to wrongful or unlawful acts of a defendant. For
example, by West Virginia statute, the injury to a father's peace and happiness
because of the seduction of his minor daughter creates a cause of action. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-7-1 (1966). Also, the humiliation and shame caused by insulting
words creates a cause of action. Id. § 2. Such causes of action also exist where there
has been an invasion of one's right to privacy, Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869,
105 S.E.2d 564 (1958); mutilation, mishandling, or improper burial of a dead body,
England v. Central Pocahontas Coal Co., 86 W. Va. 575, 104 S.E. 46 (1920); and
an improper substance found in food, Webb v. Brown & Williams Tobacco Co., 121
W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898 (1939) (dead spiny caterpillar found in a plug of tobacco).
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however, involved intentional or malicious and wanton torts rather
than negligent ones. Therefore, the court was more inclined to find
liability if any basis for recovery could be established. The rele-
vance of intentionally caused psychic injury is manifested in a
unique way in Lambert v. Brewster. ,s The plaintiff sought recovery
for mental anguish and distress followed by a miscarriage allegedly
caused by fright and nervous shock at witnessing the assault and
battery of her father. The court's decision seems to have been
based primarily on the theory of "transferred intent.""8 Defen-
dant's intention to commit a battery upon the father was trans-
ferred to the plaintiff, allowing the injury to the plaintiff to be
classed as intentional. Based on this theory, the court found liabil-
ity without actual impact, despite the defendant's lack of knowl-
edge of the plaintiff's presence and delicate condition.
Professor Prosser has termed the Brewster decision unclear,2
and other authorities have criticized it as too severe.' Neverthe-
less, several rules in the area of psychic injury were apparently
established in this unique case: (1) There may be recovery for
physical injuries resulting from nervous shock, even without actual
impact; (2) the defendant cannot be excused because he failed to
foresee the natural result of his wrongful action if physical harm
is directly caused by the plaintiff's fright; and (3) as a matter of
public policy, the fundamental theory of common law that for
every wrong there should be a remedy must be sanctioned.
Lambert v. Brewster was a forward step in the evolution of
recovery for mental and emotional torts. Yet, the unparalleled use
of the transferred intent theory seems to limit the applicability of
Lambert and to establish no clear guidelines for future actions
based on negligence. Lambert leaves several important queries
unanswered, e.g., What if the tort were negligent rather than in-
tentional? What constitutes the physical harm for which recovery
will be allowed?22 Thus, when Monteleone was presented to the
'97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
"The theory of transferred intent is based on the idea that if the defendant
intends to injure A but unforeseeably injures B instead, he is liable to B for an
intentional tort. For a discussion of the "transferred intent theory," see Prosser,
Transferred Intent, 45 TXAS L. REV. 650 (1967).
"Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. Rzv. 40, 56 (1956). Prosser also
points out that Brewster is the only case "which appears ever to have applied to
mental distress at the peril of a third person the doctrine of 'transferred intent.'"
21E.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. Rzv. 1033, 1044 n.44 (1936).
"Other questions, not within the scope of this note but of great importance to
[Vol. 76
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West Virginia court, judicial precedent was limited to the impact
theory, the parasitic tort theory and the exceptional transferred
intent theory of Lambert. The question of recovery for negligently
caused mental injury had not yet confronted the court.
B. The Monteleone Case
Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co.,2 commonly consid-
ered the major case on psychic injury in West Virginia, was de-
cided in 1945. In an action of trespass on the case, Mrs. Monteleone
sought to recover from the transit company for posttraumatic psy-
choneurosis caused by nervous shock. The plaintiff was a passen-
ger in an automobile when one of defendant's trolley wires fell,
shattering the automobile windshield and showering the plaintiff
with small slivers of glass. Mrs. Monteleone's only immediate in-
jury was a slight facial cut. Two weeks later, however, the plaintiff
began to suffer severe psychological effects that required medical
attention. Mrs. Monteleone brought an action against the defen-
dant on the theory that mental and emotional disturbances which
accompany actual physical injury caused by defendant's negli-
gence are recoverable. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision in favor of the plaintiff and held that there
could be no recovery for psychic injury due to nervous shock when
no substantial physical injury is claimed and no relationship is
shown between the injury caused by the impact and the mental
condition for which damages are sought. 24
Since Monteleone will be the cornerstone on which to build
any theory of recovery for mental and emotional injuries, an in-
depth analysis of the court's decision is necessary to determine the
strengths or weaknesses of this foundation. One obvious weakness
is that the court's decision was made almost thirty years ago. If,
as the Monteleone court intimated, the common law is to "keep
abreast of development and progress," the case must now be
viewed in light of subsequent developments in law and medicine.
The "embryonic theories" on which the court found no need to
comment at that time" have, in many instances, evolved into prov-
the negligently inflicted mental and emotional tort field, were also raised by
Brewster. For example, would the same rule apply if plaintiff were an unrelated
bystander or if plaintiff had not seen the beating but suffered like injuries as a result
of later hearing of the assault?
128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945).2
"Id. at 352, 36 S.E.2d at 480.
2Id. at 347, 36 S.E.2d at 478.
"Id. The court's notice of these theories is discussed in note 6 supra.
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able facts.27 In addition, even the principle on which the court
based its decision now appears untenable and contrary to modern
scientific evidence. Now, twenty-nine years later, strict adherence
to the principle of recovery set forth in Monteleone may cause the
court to overlook sound reasoning more applicable to the particular
facts of the case at hand.8
For example, in Monteleone, the court limited its decision to
the principal theory on which the plaintiff brought her action. The
plaintiff contended that the basis of her cause of action would lie
within the impact theory, allowing recovery for mental disturb-
ances which accompany or follow actual physical injury. Of the
three theories then recognized by the court,29 this theory was the
logical choice and the strongest ground on which the plaintiff could
base her cause of action." She had received a physical injury,
although slight, from the impact, her mental condition had fol-
lowed the physical injury, and a number of previous cases had
sustained recovery under the "slightest touch" rule." The court
concluded, however, that the lack of a causal relationship between
the plaintiffs pimple-sized cut and-the alleged mental harm was
2See text accompanying notes 65-74 infra.
21See Green, "'Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. REv. 761, 774 (1933), where the author
points out that the folly of the "principle controls" theory is the idea that if recovery
is allowed in one fright case, it must be allowed in all. He goes on to say that "the
merits of the particulAr case require no such result. There is doubtless as much
variability in 'fright' cases as in other sorts of personal injury cases." Unless each
case is viewed on its own merits, the "principle controls" folly could, perhaps, be
applied to Monteleone and result in the belief that if recovery is disallowed in
Monteleone, it must be disallowed in all such cases.
2128 W. Va. 340, 347, 36 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1945). See also text accompanying
note 5 supra.
"
9At the time Monteleone was decided, many courts, fearing fabricated claims,
denied recovery altogether in negligence cases where fright or shock, unaccompan-
ied by impact, caused emotional or mental injuries. However, even at that time,
use of this doctrine had begun to wane. In states where the doctrine still existed,
distinctions began to develop which avoided much of the restrictiveness of the rule.
For example, the "slightest touch" rule developed. This rule is discussed in note
31 infra. For a discussion of the ambiguities in the case law of negligently caused
mental and emotional injuries, see C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAM-
AGES § 89 (1935).
3 Under the "slightest touch" rule a wrongful impact, no matter how slight, was
held sufficient to sustain a recovery for mental and emotional injury. Christy Bros.
Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (evacuation of bowels by
horse); McArdle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095
(1915) (slight jar); Porter v. Delaware Lackawanna & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A.
860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930)
(smoke).
[Vol. 76
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so clearly apparent that, as a matter of law, the defendant could
not be held liable. The court reasoned that it was unrealistic and
illogical for so slight a physical injury to cause such a severe mental
disturbance in a normal individual.2
Because this review represents only one approach to the prob-
lem of liability, other approaches may exist which would establish
a cause of action. Therefore, the court's decision need not be
strictly applied in deciding similar cases. Instead, its conclusion
must necessarily be considered in relation with three other impor-
tant principles which the court did not discuss. First, the "minor
contacts" or "slightest touch" theory of impact set out in several
cases was the child of administrative expediency, not a product of
the liability formula. 3 It was simply a means of supplying justifi-
cation for a recovery where no real precedent existed. Second, the
right of recovery should rest on the causal connection between the
defendant's negligence and the plaintiffs injury. The minuteness,
or even the absence, of bodily injury should have little or no im-
portance if the negligence of the defendant is such that it would
naturally cause severe emotional injury.34 Third, mental pain and
suffering can result not only from physical injuries but also from
solely emotional experiences, such as fright and shock. The fright
or shock is the link in the chain of causation between the negli-
gence and the injurs.3
Closer scrutiny of Monteleone reveals another guideline for
future litigation of mental and emotional tort actions. More than
once the court intimated that, had the plaintiff contended that her
nervous condition was in itself a physical injury, a cause of action
32But see Modlin, Psychiatric Reactions to Accidents, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 317
(1967). The author takes the position that the more serious and disabling the injury,
the less likely that there will be psychiatric complications. The reason given is that
when there are significant physical damages the patient has something real to cope
with instead of something intangible. This operates to neutralize any neurotic
symptoms.
"Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 334, 150 A. 540,
543 (1930); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability of
Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REv. 193, 232 (1944).
"'See generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MIcH.
L. REV. 497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases, 27 ILL. L. Rv. 761 (1933); McNiece,
Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (1949); Note,
Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the "Nervous
Shock" Cases, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 512 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Negligence and
the Infliction of Emotional Harm].
3Selzer, Psychological Stress and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 951, 954 (1971).
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and possible recovery would have been allowed . 3 Because the
plaintiff had not so contended, the court did not consider her cause
of action within the second category allowing recovery, i.e., where
there is no injury or impact at the time but a physical injury later
results from the nervous shock. The court stated its commitment
to this doctrine and went on to explain away the earlier case of
Davis v. Western Union Telegraph Co. which was not in accord-
ance with this principle, having been decided before the theory of
a person's legal right to mental tranquility had been developed to
any. extent.
The court also discussed at length the case of Orlo v. Connecti-
cut Co. 37 because its facts were more nearly like those in
Monteleone than those in any other case. Orlo was distinguished,
however, because in that case there was a physical injury following
the shock, while in Monteleone there was none. Mr. Orlo's injury
consisted of severe fright that caused him to shake and tremble
and an aggravation of existing diabetes and arteriosclerosis. How-
ever, the injuries suffered by Mrs. Monteleone were as much physi-
cally manifested as those suffered by Mr. Orlo. She suffered fre-
quent attacks of violent headaches, often thought the telephone
rang when it did not, suffered from constant nervousness, which
kept her from doing her work or enjoying Pny recreation, and was
under a physician's care. Medical experts testified that her symp-
toms were not feigned. Yet, since the symptoms were not of a
somatic origin, the court deemed them not physical.
The pervading issue, then, is whether mental and emotional
disturbances constitute physical injury?" Today the answer is de-
2128 W. Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (19,15). The court repeatedly emphasized that
the "[pilaintiff below [did] not contend that she suffered a physical injury" or
that "the nervous shock ... was a physical injury." Although the court recognized
that there could be "a recovery in the absence of impact where the nervous shock
is followed by physical injury traceable to it," it noted that "here there [was]
none." Id. at 347, 349-50, 36 S.E.2d at 478, 479-80.
:128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941). The plaintiff was a passenger in an automo-
bile that was following a trolley car of the defendant. Due to the trolley car opera-
tor's alleged negligence, the car struck the trolley wires, causing them to break and
fall upon the auto in which the plaintiff was riding. He continued to sit in the auto
with the wires flashing and hissing about it. Plaintiff claimed that he suffered
nervous shock and severe fright and that a condition of diabetes and arteriosclerosis
was aggravated. The court overruled the lower court's decision for the defendant
and held that the injured party is entitled to recover when negligence is proved to
be the proximate cause of fright or shock which in turn produces injuries that would
be elements of damage had a bodily injury been suffered.
There are semantic difficulties associated with the word physical. As used in
[Vol. 76
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cidedly in the affirmative. A definite nervous disorder can, and
often does, have far reaching physical effects on the human body.
For example, the West Virginia court, in Lambert v. Brewster,39
recognized a miscarriage as being such an effect." Many other
courts have also recognized that a definite nervous disorder is suffi-
cient physical injury to support an action for damages.4' The physi-
cal injuries caused by the wrecking of the nervous system are often
far more serious and lasting than broken bones or torn flesh.42
The Monteleone decision left open the door to actions based
on the concept of physical injuries. Therefore, if a plaintiff, in a
case analogous to Monteleone, proves physical injuries, i.e., a defi-
nite nervous disorder, a cause of action will lie.13 The test which
earlier language, its meaning is misleading because mental and emotional aspects
of the individual were viewed as separate from the somatic system. The current
tendency is to view the human organism as a unit. Therefore, physical injuries are
no longer limited to purely bodily damage but include emotional and mental dam-
ages as well. Goodrich, supra note 34, at 501, contended that "emotion as a purely
mental thing does not exist" but "always has a physical side." Thus, he claimed
that the judicial language formulated was inaccurate and an admission that emo-
tional and mental states are physical would facilitate the courts' handling of the
issue.
197 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 244 (1924).
"Although a miscarriage was one of the earliest physical manifestations of
emotional trauma recognized as sufficient to permit recovery, medical science has
demonstrated that fright and other solely mental forces do not ordinarily cause
miscarriages. For example, in an analysis of one thousand cases of spontaneous
abortions, only one could definitely be attributed to traumatic or psychic disturb-
ances. McNiece, supra note 34, at 78 n.259. For a collection of authorities on this
question, see Note, Tort Liability for Miscarriage Caused by Fright, 15 U. Cm. L.
REv. 188 (1947).
"See United States v. Grant, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969); Penick v. Mirro, 189
F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249
P.2d 843 (1953); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Cashin v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934); Crews v. Provident Fin. Co.,
271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 405,
234 A.2d 656 (1967).
"Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934). Numerous
authorities in the fields of law, medicine, and psychology also support this princi-
ple. See L. KEISER, THE TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS (1968); PsYcmc TRAUMA (S. Furst ed.
1967); 6 TRAUMATIc MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY pt. XIII (P. Cantor
ed. 1962); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REv. 497
(1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:
Legal Liability of Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. Rav. 193 (1944); Throckmorton,
Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REv. 260 (1921); Usdin, Neurosis Following
Trauma, in LAw, MEDICINE, SCIENcE-AND JUsTIcE 234 (L. Bear ed. 1964).
"See United States v. Grant, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969). There the court
10
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has been set forth by a federal district court in Virginia could be
the standard in future cases: "[1It is unreal to attempt to distin-
guish between mental and physical injury. An affront to either the
mental or the physical sensibilities is an affront to the personal
being." The question is whether the "'damage' is of substance and
sufficiently identifiable in the person of the claimant."4
Although the Monteleone court's concern for throwing wide
open the door to subjective symptoms of mental injury was once a
valid objection to the plaintiffs claim, this contention is of ques-
tionable validity today. However, several difficulties are still pres-
ent: (1) Distinguishing the valid claims from the false; (2) separat-
ing serious mental disorders from trifling isolated emotional up-
sets; and (3) determining the amount of damage if such an injury
exists. The advancements of medical science should help alleviate
most of these problems.
Many areas of uncertainty in the causes and symptoms of
psychic injury now have been clarified4 5 Moreover, the possibility
of feigned suffering and speculation has nevbr been a problem
particularly indigenous to damages without impact. The possibil-
ity exists in any personal injury claim where medical evidence
must be weighed, yet, the courts have allowed the jury to use their
sound judgment in determining the validity of a plaintiff's claim."
The statement of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in
Lambert v. Brewster, summarizes the best approach to this public
policy issue:
While it may be that injuries resulting from fright are readily
simulated and the avenue for fraud is thus left open to more
easy approach, the most that we can say is that if the injury
suffered is traced proximately through the fright to defendant's
stated that "a definite nervous disorder is a 'physical injury' sufficient to support
an action for damages for negligence." Id. at 269.
"Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947, 949 (E.D. Va. 1960).
"See text accompanying notes 65-74 infra..,
"See Williams v. Pennsylvania Line Servs., Inc., 147 W. Va. 195, 204, 126
S.E.2d 384, 389 (1962), where the court quoted from a Maine case, Coombs v. King,
107 Me. 376, 78 A. 468 (1910):
The damages [sic] from suffering, either mental or physical, cannot be
weighed; it cannot be measured; it cannot be computed. It can only be
estimated. The difficulty in making the estimation affords no good reason
for failure to make it .... The estimation must depend upon the good
sense, sound judgment, and enlightened conscience of the jury, under all
the facts and circumstances of the particular case, and the sensibilities
of the particular person.
[Vol. 76
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wrong, the matter of sifting the true from the untrue in the proof
is more properly addressed to the good sense of our juries than
to this court."
II. MEDICO-LEGAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN RECOVERY FOR MENTAL
AND EMOTIONAL INJURY
Before developing possible theories which are consonant with
modern medical thought for mental and emotional injury cases, it
is necessary to discuss the inevitable medico-legal problems which
confront the courts and lawyers in these cases. The first question
that arises is that which faced the court in Monteleone-what is
the legal definition of "physical hatm"? In United States v. Grant,
the First Circuit defined "physical" as a "condition or illness...
susceptible of objective determination. 4 8 In that case, a definite
nervous disorder was held sufficient to support an action for dam-
ages caused by negligence. A problem arises, however, in determin-
ing exactly what constitutes a definite nervous disorder. The defi-
nition must necessarily exclude such symptomatic emotional
harms as mere upset, dismay, grief, hurt feelings, and anger, for if
mere negligence could result in liability for minor psychological
harms, an unrealistic duty of care would be imposed on all possible
defendants. This danger can be avoided, however, if proof of actual
deleterious effects on the plaintiff's health is made a prerequisite
to recovery. The burden of proof would necessarily rest on the
plaintiff to show that his injuries were of a serious and definite
nature rather than isolated mental anguish. 9 Overall, the empha-
sis should lie not on whether the injuries are physical but on
whether or not there are injuries as a direct result of defendant's
negligence. The reason for this emphasis is that severe mental and
"97 W. Va. 124, 138, 125 S.E. 244, 249 (1924).
4'418 F.2d 264, 269 (1st Cir. 1969).
"See Editor's Comment, Traumatic Neurosis: A Common Problem, 2 LAwyE's
MED. J. no. 2, at 174-75 (Aug. 1973). The editor suggests several factors to be
considered by the plaintiff's lawyer when establishing the proof necessary to show
a definite nervous disorder: (1) The extent and adequacy of study and treatment
of the plaintiff by the medical expert is relevant in determining the validity, seri-
ousness, and prognosis of plaintiff's injuries. (2) Since the credibility of the plain-
tiff's claim is significantly grounded upon behavior patterns, proof of changes in
personality, social habits, working habits, and general adjustment to the world
around him is important. (3) Where an organic basis exists for the traumatic
neurosis, e.g., brain damage, proof should clarify all aspects of the relationship. (4)
The medical witness should pinpoint the specific type of neurosis, the criteria used
in making his diagnosis, and the logical sequence of symptoms in the plaintiff's
illness.
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emotional injury is tantamount to physical injury. Both result in
illness or sickness which, depending on the severity, can debilitate,
deteriorate, or totally disable the human body."0
Second, the question arises, as in Davis v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.,51 whether psychic injuries are too vague and subjec-
tive in nature to be the subject of a claim for damages. Although
many types of physiological and functional changes may follow
crisis or shock, 52 development in medical technology has made it
increasingly easier to establish and prove the direct manifestations
of psychological injuries. Expert medical testimony should be suf-
ficient to dispell any questions as to the genuineness of the plain-
tiff's claim. Several problems are inherent in the use of expert
testimony.53 There is a "shadow-land" area of psychic injury where
the experts themselves disagree. Terminology is not uniform
throughout the medical profession, much less among laymen, and
this tends to further complicate the diagnosis of the particular
symptoms.5' Since the symptoms of psychic injury vary widely and
are often non-specific, objective criteria for determining injuries
are lacking. 5 Still, these problems are not insurmountable.5" If the
"The following query can illustrate the principle that the orderly functions of
man's mind and emotions are as vital to his efficient operation as his legs, arms,
eyes, or ears: Which is more injurious to man, a sound mind in a disabled bbdy or
an unsound mind in an able body?
5146 W. Va. 48, 32 S.E. 1026 (1899).
5 Effects of emotional shock can be classified under two main categories: Psy-
chosomatic disorders, which are manifested by organic, bodily symptoms, and psy-
choneurotic disorders, which are manifested by purely psychological symptoms. For
an explanation and further sub-classification of these disorders following shock or
crisis, see L. KEISER, THE TRAUMATIC NEUROSIS ch. 5 (1968). See also Havard,
Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. Rav. 478 (1956),
"McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 1, 73 (1949).
'Laughlin, Neurosis Following Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDCINE AND SURGERY
FOR THE ATroRNE 85 (P. Cantor ed. 1962).
Traumatic neurosis has yet to be accorded a separate niche in the official
diagnostic and statistical nomenclatures df the American Medical Asso-
ciation and the American Psychiatric Association.
The scientific literature reflects a lack of unanimity of professional
views. Authorities use various diagnostic terms for the large group of
neuroses following trauma, and occasionally use different terms to de.
scribe similar clinical reactions.
See also Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm, supra note 34, at 517.
-'See PSYCHIC TRAUMA 37 (S. Furst ed. 1967):
The crucial variable is intensity-i.e., whether or not the stimulus, or the
combination of stimuli, is strong enough to pierce the stimulus barrier.
The intensity of the stimulus, however, cannot be measured by any single
[Vol. 76
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physical effect of the strong psychological disturbance is a result
that can be traced and seen, the plaintiff should have an unequivo-
cal right to recover."
However, given the fact that the plaintiffs injuries are genu-
ine, another problem of proof exists which is threefold. First, there
is the argument that the defendant's negligence merely precipi-
tated an already existing tendency toward such an illness. 8 Even
in the community of psychologists, there is a group that specifi-
cally stresses this "pre-traumatic personality"5 as the key to the
problem, while disregarding the stimulating force. However, other
psychologists disagree with this theory and emphasize the stimu-
lating force instead. The critical question, then, on the legal level,
might be whether the illness would have appeared in time, even
criterion. Rather, its traumatic potential will depend on a number of
factors, including constitutional predisposition, the state of the psychic
apparatus, and the relatedness or lack of relatedness of the stimulus itself
to prevailing drive-cathected wishes and conflicts. Thus, a given stimulus
may be traumatic for one individual but not for another; further, for a
given individual, a stimulus that is traumatic at one time may be assimi-
lated without being overwhelming at another.
"See Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963). In that case the
court stated, "[W]e now possess the tools whereby we can intelligently evaluate
claims of emotional injury. Psychiatry and clinical psychology, while not exact
sciences, can provide sufficiently reliable information . . . to enable a trier of fact
to make intelligent evaluative judgments on a plaintiff's claim." Id. at 359, 124
N.W.2d at 317.
51TSee Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965); Stewart v.
Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1972); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d
509 (1970); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Toms v. Mc Connell,
207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. 1973); Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d
381 (1967).
5'According to Furst, these tendencies, which he calls preconditions of trauma,
fall roughly into three categories: (1) Constitutional factors which include "abnor-
mally strong or deviant instinctual endowment" and "innate ego weakness"; (2)
effects of past experience which serve to compromise or strengthen the ego capaci-
ties; and (3) the psychic state prevailing at the time the traumatic stimulus is
perceived. Psycmc TRAuMA 38 (S. Furst ed. 1967).
11L. KEISER, supra note 52, at 22. See also Usdin, supra note 42, at 237, where
the author states that triggered neuroses constitute the majority of psychic injury
cases. He likens an individual's personality to an iceberg, seven eighths below the
surface and one-eighth above. He further explains:
An appropriate assessment of the importance of the precipitating event
can be made only if the individual's entire personality structure is care-
fully studied and special evaluation is made of his other problems. . ..
In neurosis triggered by trauma, the history may appear to date from the
injury but this usually is an artifact that provides the patient with an
acceptable excuse for his numerous problems in life.
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without the precipitating event. Assuming that a definite "yes"
could be given, the answer should not be of great consequence for
two reasons. First, if this premise were true, then the same logic
could be extended to justify even negligently caused death by say-
ing that the decedent would have died eventually anyway. Second,
there is a distinction between the standard of liability and the
extent of recovery. 0 If there is proof that defendant's negligence
would cause a substantial risk of emotional injury to a normal
person, the defendant is liable. His lack of knowledge of the extent
of possible damage to the plaintiff is no defense. The "thin skull
rule"'" applies, requiring that the defendant take his victim as he
finds him.
This leads to the second part of the three-fold problem-the
difficulty in ascertaining the normal person or the normal reaction
to such stimuli as shock and fear.62 Admittedly, there is no statis-
tical compilation of data showing how people react and the degree
of emotional harm resulting from specific stimuli. But, neither are
there any such statistics for determining the "reasonably prudent
man." Thus, as with the reasonably prudent man test, the judg-
ment of normalcy should rest in the common sense and sound
estimation of the jury, having weighed the particular facts of the
case.
The jury itself is the third part of the threefold problem. The
average juror often has difficulty in grasping the concept that
physical maladies actually can result from mental and emotional
wNegligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm, supra note 34, at 518. The
following hypothetical is used to emphasize the distinction between the standard
of liability and the extent of recovery: D smashes P's car. One inquires whether P
is hurt, not whether P was thrown through the windshield, flipped three times in
the air, and landed on his head. Analogously, in an emotional injury case, the
standard of liability is determined by whether injury was likely, not by whether the
victim's specific reactions were likely. Once liability is found, the extent of plain-
tiff's recovery is measured proportionately by the extent of his injuries.
"The "thin skull rule" is derived from a reference by Kennedy, J., in Dulieu
v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669, 679 (1901), one of the earliest shock cases. Judge
Kennedy emphasized that once the defendant's negligence which caused the injury
is established, then the defendant is liable for the whole damage. "lit is no answer
to the sufferer's claim for damages that he would have suffered less injury, or no
injury at all, if he had not had an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart."
Accord, Harris v. Norfolk So. Ry., 319 F.2d 493 (4th Cir. 1963).
621 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 2 (1962). Not only is
there no positive definition of health but, also, the term normalcy is a misnomer.
There is no definite standard of normalcy since what is normal for one individual
is not necessarily normal for another and may even be abnormal.
[Vol. 76
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trauma or that definite psychic disorders are physical in nature.
Unless there has been some kind of bodily impact, the juror is apt
to view the plaintiff as a malingerer. This is partially attributable
to historical misconceptions surrounding psychic injury. 3 Until
fairly recently, medical scholars believed that all mental and emo-
tional ills were traceable to physical problems. The impact rule is
a reflection of this theory in our case law. Medical science has since
proved the fallacy of this concept.6 Nevertheless, the lawyer is
faced with making credible to the jury the plaintiff's claim of men-
tal and emotional injury. To a great extent, this can be done by
providing the jury with the testimony of medical experts who use
terminology that the jurors can understand.
Even with competent medical experts as witnesses, the lawyer
is faced with still another critical and controversial issue-the va-
lidity of psychological evaluations as to the extent, duration, and
prognosis of the mental or emotional injury. 5 The evaluation and
assessment of claims for such damages are seldom a simple matter.
Psychological tests are, indeed, some of the most subjective of all
medicine's diagnostic tools. Measurement of impairment is often
indirect and vicarious since it deals with manifest results of a
mental and emotional basis. Additionally, the many theories ad-
vanced to explain actions, emotions, and behavior of individuals
and the disagreements among psychiatrists tend to minimize the
value of psychiatric testimony. 6 A determination of the degree of
liability and a fair estimation of the extent of damage in mental
and emotional injury litigation "can well tax the judgment of a
twentieth century Solomon."6
However, a diagnosis of posttraumatic neurosis can be made
with reasonable medical certainty. Although psychiatric findings
3For a summary of the historical development of psychic injuries, see L.
KEISER, supra note 52, at 12; 6 TRAUMATc MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATrORNEY
87 (P. Cantor ed. 1962).
O'See text accompanying notes 65-74 infra.
61In a recent study of 321 cases of posttraumatic neurosis three years after
litigation was settled, 67 of the 321 still had some form of neurosis. Only one had
made a complete recovery. Of the 66 who had not completely recovered, one-third
had shown improvement and returned to work, but their earnings were down over
40%; one-third had shown no improvement but returned to work. Their earnings
were down 60%. The other one-third had not returned to work. Dearman, Neurosis
as the Result of Trauma, in 3 LAWvERs' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 210 (C. Frankel ed.
1970).
"McNeal, The Value of a Psychiatrist, in LEGAL MEDICINE ANNUAL 305 (C.
Wecht ed. 1972).
"Laughlin, supra note 54, at 82.
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may not be altogether tangible in nature, "they are just as objec-
tive, if not more so, than many material findings in physical ill-
ness."68 The psychologist conducts certain quantitative tests"8 on
the patient which have been standardized by using thousands of
known cases. Thus, objective interpretations are possible by com-
paring the patient's responses to the typical responses of many
other persons previously tested. In addition, the psychologist
makes qualitative appraisals of the patient in interviews." By
studying the patient's history, both medical and social, the psy-
chologist can determine the severity of such impairments by mea-
suring the amount of the patient's regression.
The ultimate concern is to determine whether the patient has
received a permanent impairment' in terms of loss of physiologi-
cal, psychological, personal, or social adjustment. Many changes,
both physiological and functional, can occur as a result of
trauma.12 Some are only temporary, functional changes. However,
"'Dearman, supra note 65, at 207.
I'M. Hours, LAWYERS' GuIDE To MEDICAL PROOF, ch. 20 (1966); 3 LAWYERS'
MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA ch. 21 (C. Frankel ed. 1970); See generally Dearman, The
Psychiatric Examination of the Client, 32 TENN. L. Rzv. 592 (1965).
7V1he psychological examination includes three basic techniques: (1) Psycho-
metric tests, e.g., Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI); (2)
standardized behavior samples, e.g., thematic apperception (subject perception
and interpretation) procedures, object-sorting tests, "draw-a-figure" tasks; and (3)
special techniques of clinical interviewing, such as interviewing in order to elicit
clues as to significant aspects of personality, intellectual function, attitudes, and
motives.
"'A distinction is made between permanent impairment, which is a purely
medical condition, and permanent disability, which is not purely medical but in-
volves a determination by a trier of facts. The physician determines whether the
patient has suffered an automatic or functional abnormality that is stable even
after maximum rehabilitation has been achieved (permanent impairment). By
weighing this impairment with other factors, the trier of facts, on the 6ther hand,
determines whether the person's actual or presumed ability to engage in gainful
activity is reduced or absent, with no marked change expected to occur in the future
(permanent disability). 198 JOURNAL OF THE AM. MED. Ass'N 146 (1966). For a
detailed examination of criteria for evaluating permanent impairment due to neu-
rosis on a percentage scale, see W. CURRAN & E. SHAPIRO, LAw, MEDICINE AND
FORENSIC SCIENCE 145 (2d ed. 1970). The authors describe three general classes:
Class 1- Impairment of Whole Man-0%-5%; Class 2-Impairment of Whole
Man-10%-45%; Class 3-Impairment of Whole Man-50%-95%.
"Various changes include (1) anxiety; (2) gastrointestinal symptoms, e.g.,
anorexia (diminished appetite or aversion to food), nausea, weight loss; (3) cardiov-
ascular symptoms, e.g., palpitation, precordial distress, increased perspiration; (4)
genitourinary, e.g., frequency, urgency; (5) emotional fatigue; (6) weakness; (7)
headaches; (8) backaches.
[Vol. 76
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when these persist, they become chronic and can ultimately result
in "fixed structural change and irreversible organic pathology. 7 3
Others are measurable by laboratory studies, e.g., acceleration of
blood clotting time and increase in blood viscosity.7 The perma-
nency of impairment depends, to a large degree, on whether the
patient is treatable. Even if he is, treatment is expensive, often
takes a long time, and is a difficult, complex joint endeavor be-
tween patient and physician.
The overriding problem which pervades psychic injury litiga-
tion is the lack of understanding of mental and emotional injuries.
The ultimate solution to this problem can only be by way of public
education.
IV. THEORIES IN SUPPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES
Before discussing the mechanics of particular theories which
would support an independent cause of action for psychic injuries,
several factors that are indispensable in forming any such theory
must be recognized. Two of these, medical advancements and prior
case law, have been discussed previously. Some attention also
must be given to administrative feasibility and socio-economic fac-
tors, which are important for several reasons. First, any theory
must be capable of adequate administration by the courts. In the
area of psychic injuries, the question arises as to whether the law
has progressed on a parallel plane with scientific development. The
law must not, in its desire to be forward looking, outrun scientific
standards and create liability where no adequate criteria of proof
is available. Such a step would make the administration of any
remedy infeasible. 75 Also, there is the problem of setting some kind
of limit on liability for negligently inflicted mental and emotional
injury. Unless limits are set, courts will find administration of the
law extremely difficult. Moreover, it would be an entirely unrealis-
tic burden if every man were to be held liable for all emotional
damages in some way caused by his negligence, however slight.
"3A ArIORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 104 at 80 (R. Gray 3d ed. 1973).
731d.
51Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 312, 379 P.2d 513,
523, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 43 (1963). The California court summarized this problem as
follows:
"[We are left with the question of whether in this area of inquiry where emotions
play so large a role the law has now become sufficiently responsive to scientific
reality to redress the 'net balance of justice.'"
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Therefore, any theory must weigh the magnitude of the plaintiff's
risks with social practicability and disallow compensation to the
individual plaintiff if it would create injustices to society as a
whole.
Recent case law and authorities in the field have created sev-
eral theories which take these factors into consideration in sup-
porting an independent cause of action for traumatic injuries. Al-
though negligence is basic to all of these theories, they will be
classified for purposes of clarification into four categories: (1) The
pure negligence theory; (2) the theory of natural, proximate cause;
(3) the duty-foreseeability theory; and (4) the balancing theory.7"
In any negligence theory, the plaintiff first has the burden of prov-
ing that the defendant was negligent. However, the question re-
mains as to how negligence is to be determined. The suggested
answers to this question form the basis for the four classifications
of theories which are set out below.
Under the pure negligence approach, the defendant would be
held negligent only if his actions created "a substantial and unrea-
sonable risk of emotional harm to a normal person in the plaintiff's
position."" This approach requires an understanding of the mean-
ing of both "emotional harm" and "normal person" because the
legal definitions of these two terms inevitably determine the scope
of liability. "Emotional harm," in this context, is "any" mental
distress serious enough to require medical attention." The purpose
behind this definition is to arrive at a middle ground which would
allow establishment of threshold torts79 and, yet, exclude such
damages as mere upset, dismay, humiliation, grief, or anger, which
would place an unrealistic duty of care on defendants. The defini-
tion of the "normal person" would be determined primarily by the
7'Except for the pure negligence theory, which was discussed in Negligence and
the Infliction of Emotional Harm, supra note 34, these theories were not specifically
cited in any single source. They developed logically from the cases and sources used
in researching this topic. Sources primarily relied on include: Goodrich, Emotional
Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mici. L. REV. 497 (1922); Green, "Fright" Cases,
27 ILL. L. REv. 761 (1933); Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19
MoD. L. REv. 478 (1956); Hochman, 'Outrageousness' and Privilege in the Law of
Emotional Distress-A Suggestion, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 61 (1961); McNiece, Psychic
Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1949); Throckmor-
ton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. Rav. 260 (1921).
-Negligence and the Infliction of Emotional Harm, supra note 34, at 516.
71Id. at 517.
7
'Id. at 517 n.25. "'Threshold tort' here refers to the minimum requirements
for establishing a defendant's liability."
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common sense and sound estimation of the jury aided by expert
medical testimony explaining what the probable reactions of a
normal person would be. These standards of emotional harm and
normality would help solve the problem of setting some limitation
on liability. In addition, they would provide functional guidelines
by which the jury could measure the risk involved. However, this
theory presents several problems. Proof is more complicated since
emotional harm is such a fluid conceit. Not only is there no real
consensus as to what constitutes emotional harm, unlike physical
harm, but also, normality is more difficult to define in emotional
than in physical terms. The discretion of the jury is much greater.
However, if courts formulate instructions emphasizing and ex-
plaining the concepts of emotional harm, risk, and normality, this
discretion can be restricted. Courts are gradually moving toward
this theory which represents only a slight break with past law but
may produce changes that are "practically and theoretically desir-
able." 0
Under the duty-foreseeability theory, the ultimate issue is
whether a duty to use due care exists. This duty is found whenever
it is foreseeable that harm may result if the duty is not exercised.
Thus, foreseeability of harm becomes the test for the existence of
actionable negligence. This does not mean that the specific injury
must be foreseen. Instead, the test is whether some harm or harm
of a general nature is foreseeable. However, the type of injury is
relevant to the extent that it must be definite in character and
adequately supported by proof and medical testimony. It also can
be relevant in determining whether the harm is primarily the re-
sult of the plaintiff's unusual sensitivity and susceptibility to psy-
chological injury. If this is the case, the defendant would not be
liable if no harm could have been reasonably anticipated.
The theory of natural, proximate cause is more liberal since
the emphasis rests not on foreseeability but on whether there is a
causal relation between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's in-
jury. Under this theory, the particular idiosyncrasies of the plain-
tiff would tend to have no effect on the determination of liability.8'
Thus, the proof required by the plaintiff would be only two-
fold-the commission of the wrongful act and the chain of unbro-
"Id. at 528. See app. I infra.
'However, some authorities believe that particular idiosyncrasies of the plain-
tiff should have an effect on the amount of recovery, and, therefore, would reduce
the amount of damages in proportion to the peculiar susceptibilities of the plaintiff.
E.g., McNiece, supra note 53, at 71.
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ken causal connection between the defendant's alleged act and the
plaintiff's injury.
The balancing theory is actually a combination of the first
three theories in that there must be proof that the defendant was
negligent, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injuries, and that some harm was reasonably foreseea-
ble. However, this theory stresses one additional consideration.
Emphasis is placed on weighing the gravity of the defendant's
negligence against the severity of the plaintiff's injury. If the na-
ture of the defendant's negligence would likely cause psychic in-
jury and the plaintiffs injuries are not so trivial as to place an
unrealistic burden of duty on the general public, then liability
ensues.
V. CONCLUSION
Although these negligence theories have yet to be applied by
the West Virginia court in psychic injury cases, prior case law does
not preclude their adoption. Prior West Virginia case law reveals
a continual evolution in the development of the mental and emo-
tional tort from no cause of action in Davis to the unique "trans-
ferred intent" theory of Lambert. The Monteleone decision, which
at first glance would seem to prevent these new approaches, ,does
not impede this progression. The pure negligence theories, of which
the court took cognizance but deemed merely embryonic, are used
today with increasing frequency.82 In addition, the second category
of recovery recognized by the court-no injury or impact at the
time but a physical injury afterward-can be applied in a much
broader sense today. Recent developments in medical science indi-
cate that a definite emotional or mental injury does constitute the
physical injury required in Monteleone. Moreover, medical ad-
vancements have dispelled many of the earlier fears concerning
inadequate proof and fabricated injuries. Although some problems
still exist, they are not of such magnitude as to prevent the court
from recognizing an independent cause of action for negligently
caused mental and emotional injuries.
The theories set forth in this note are not only interrelated but
also represent merely slight variations of the same ultimate princi-
ple-that an independent cause of action for mental and emotional
injuries should exist with recovery based on the facts and proof of
"See text accompanying note 4 supra. See also app. I. infra.
0 See text accompanying notes 65-74 supra.
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each case. If the plaintiff shows that (1) the defendant was negli-
gent; (2) the negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's in-
juries; (3) the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were established by
medical testimony as being genuine; and (4) the defendant could
reasonably have foreseen that his negligence would cause harm,
then the defendant should be held liable. In short, an action to
recover for mental and emotional damages resulting from trauma
should be treated the same as any other tort action for personal
injuries. The difficult cases must be entrusted to the quality and
genuineness of proof, the contemporary sophistication of medical
technology, the wisdom of the courts, and the ability of the jury
to discern the dishonest from the honest claim." To allow an inde-
pendent cause of action for such injuries, rather than to require the
action to be tacked on to some other kind of existing claim, is a
step toward making the law answerable to wrongs that should not
go unrighted. As one author aptly expressed almost a half century
ago:
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor
belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A
factor which is today recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-
morrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability. It is
merely a question of social, economic, and industrial needs as
those needs are reflected in the organic law.8
Jean Karen Dressier
"Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1961).
1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATION op LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
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APPENDIX
SURVEY OF CASE LAW IN STATES RECOGNIZING A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED
MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL INJURIES WITH PHYSICAL
MANIFESTATIONS
This survey deals primarily with solely negligent infliction of
mental and emotional harm. Neither intentional infliction of such
harm, generally recognized in all states, nor parasitic tort actions
are covered.
The cases cited primarily exemplify one or more of four basic
principles: (1) Severe shock to the nervous system constitutes
physical injury; (2) mental and emotional damages are sufficient
to create a cause of action; (3) a cause of action lies if the negli-
gence is the proximate cause of the fright or shock; and (4) a cause
of action lies if the damage is foreseeable.
Those cases marked with an asterisk have extended recovery
for mental and emotional injuries sustained to bystanders who
witness the negligent injury of third persons.
State Citation
1. California
2. Colorado
3. Connecticut
4. Delaware
5. Florida
Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers, 8 Cal. App.
3d 844, 88 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1970).
Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d
912 (1968).*
Vanoi v. Western Airlines, 56 Cal. Rptr.
115, 247 A.2d 793 (1967).
Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314
(D. Colo. 1965).
Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156
A.2d 149 (1963).
Orlo v. Connecticut, 128 Conn. 231, 21
A.2d 402 (1941).
Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454,
210 A.2d 709 (1965).
Stewart v. Gilliam, 271 So. 2d 466 (Fla.
1972) (injury was myocardial infarction).
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6. Georgia
7. Hawaii
8. Idaho
9. Iowa
10. Louisiana
11. Maine
12. Maryland
13. Massachusetts
14. Michigan
Johnson v. Herlong Aviation, Inc., 271 So.
2d 226 (Fla. 1972) (impact doctrine re-
jected).
But see Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So.
2d 865 (Fla. 1972).
Usry v. Small, 103 Ga. App. 144, 118
S.E.2d 719 (1961) (heart attack resulted).
Marcelli v. Teasley, 72 Ga. App. 421, 33
S.E.2d 836 (1945) (intentional tort action).
Gardner v. Newnan Hosp., 58 Ga. App.
104, 198 S.E. 122 (1938).
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472
P.2d 509 (1970).
Summers v. Western Idaho Potato Pro-
cessing Co., 94 Idaho 1, 479 P.2d 292
(1970).
Northup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204
N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973).
Sahuc v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963).
Clegg v. Hardware Mut. Casket Co., 264
F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1959).
Rezza v. Cziffer, 186 So. 2d 174 (La. 1966).
McCastle v. Woods, 180 So. 2d 421 (La.
1965).
Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants,
Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970).
Zeigler v. F St. Corp., 248 Md. 223, 235
A.2d 703 (1967).
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951).
Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A.
182 (1933).
Petition of United States, 418 F.2d 264
(1st Cir. 1969).
Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647,
207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).*
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15. Minnes
16. Mississi
17. Missour
18. Montan
19. Nebrasl
20. Nevada
21. New HE
22. New Je
23. New Yo
24. N. Caro
25. N. Dak
26. Ohio
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Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4,179 N.W.2d
390 (1970).
ota Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn.
400, 165 N.W.2d 259 (1969).
ppi Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So.
2d 481 (Miss. 1972) (defendant must have
acted maliciously, intentionally, or with
gross carelessness).
Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139,
150 So. 2d 154 (1963).
i Warren v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670 (Mo.
1969) (defendant's action must have been
outrageous or extreme).
a Kelly v. Lowney & Williams, 113 Mont.
385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942).
a Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W.
335 (1931).
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Nolton, 58 Nev.
133, 71 P.2d 1051 (1937).
mpshire Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792
(1950).
Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale
Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 A. 540 (1930).
rsey Falsone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12
(1965).
rk Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169
(C.A.N.Y. 1970).
Battalla v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
N.E.2d 729 (1961).
lina Petition of United States, 303 F. Supp.
1282 (E.D.N.C. 1969).
Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684,
157 S.E.2d 381 (1967).
ota Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d
678 (1972) (abandoned impact rule).
Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442,
140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).
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27. Oklahoma
28. Oregon
29. Pennsylvania
30. R.I.
31. S. Carolina
32. Tennessee
33. Vermont
34. Virginia
35. Wisconsin
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Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 195
F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952) (shock defined
as the result of injury and its effect on the
brain).
Pakos v. Clark, 253 Ore. 113, 453 P.2d 682
(1969) (defendant's act must be outra-
geous).
Hovis v. Burns, 243 Ore. 607, 415 P.2d 29
(1966) (disinterment case).
Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261
A.2d 84 (1970).
D'Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp.
810 (D.C.R.I. 1973).*
Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186,
66 A. 202 (1907) (fright gives rise to nerv-
ous disturbances and those in turn to
physical troubles).
Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib.
Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958).
Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn. App. 182, 397
S.W.2d 409 (1965).
Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt.
405, 234 A.2d 656 (1967).
Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d
214 (1973).
Redepenning v. Dore, 56 Wis. 2d 129, 201
N.W.2d 580 (1972).
Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177
N.W.2d 83 (1970).
Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85
N.W.2d 345 (1965).
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